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Computational analyses of organizational behavior employ either intellective or emulative models [1].  
The model described in this paper
1
 is an intellective models.  Intellective models are usually abstract, 
small, relatively simple, and incorporate only a few parameters. They help modelers make general 
predictions about trends and the relative benefit of organizational changes, identify the range of likely 
behaviors, and qualitatively compare the impact of different types of policies or technologies on expected 
behaviors. Emulative models are much more detailed, incorporate a large number of parameters or rules, 
are more difficult and expensive to construct, and require large volumes of input data. They help modelers 
make specific predictions about quantitative characteristics of organizational behavior for specific 
organizations under specific conditions, and compare quantitatively the expected impact of alternative 
organizational designs or policy changes. 
The models in this paper demonstrate how self-reinforcing error due to positive feedback can lead to 
overload and saturation of decision-making elements, and ultimately the cascading collapse of an 
organization due to the propagation of overload and erroneous decisions throughout the organization.   
We begin the paper with an analysis of the stability of the decision-making aspects of command 
organizations from a system-theoretic perspective. A simple dynamic model shows how an organization 
can enter into a self-reinforcing cycle of increasing decision workload until the demand for decisions 
exceeds the decision-making capacity of the organization. In this model we consider only two 
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components corresponding to two layers of an organization—an upper command layer and a subordinate 
execution layer. We show that even this simple model offers useful insights into conditions under which 
an organization can experience a rapid decrease in decision quality. 
We then extend the model to more complex networked organizations and show that they also experience a 
form of self-reinforcing degradation. In particular, we find that the degradation in decision quality has a 
tendency to propagate through the hierarchical structure, i.e. overload at one location affects other 
locations by overloading the higher-level components which then in turn overload their subordinates.   
But how would one devise measures that actually induce such a malfunction in an enemy organization? 
Conversely, how would one devise a set of actions that mitigate a malfunction in their own organization? 
Our computational experiments suggest several strategies for mitigating this type of malfunction: 
dumping excessive load, empowering lower echelons, minimizing the need for coordination, using 
command-by-negation, insulating weak performers, and applying on-line diagnostics. Further, a suitable 
compensating component, e.g. a brokering mechanism that dynamically re-distributes responsibilities 
within the organization as it begins to malfunction, can dramatically increase the envelope of stable 
performance. We describe a method to allocate decision responsibility and arrange information flow 
dynamically within a team of decision-makers for command and control. We argue that dynamic 
modification of the decision responsibilities and information-sharing links within a decision-making team 
can either degrade or improve (depending on the intent of the one who performs the modifications) 
stability and performance in terms of quality of decisions produced by the team.    
A Simple Model for Self-Reinforcing Decision Overload 
Let us consider a network of decision-making entities, perhaps individuals, teams of individuals, 
information-processing tools, or artificial agents, operating jointly in accordance with organizational 
procedures and protocols.  Such a decision-making organization acquires, transforms, generates and 
3 
disseminates information in order to acquire, allocate, and deploy its resources so that its objectives can 
be accomplished efficiently and effectively. A decision-making organization’s ultimate product is the 
commands it issues to those operational elements that execute direct effects on the environment of the 
organization. We label the totality of these executing elements as the field. The field may include 
salespeople who are trying to affect the behavior of the buyers in the market; workers who assemble the 
products; trading floor clerks who execute the transactions; pilots of military aircraft who fly to bomb 
their targets. To illustrate the kinds of malfunctions we wish to model here, consider the following 
scenarios. 
Scenario A. After a major financial loss, a corporation forces one of its underperforming divisions into a 
major restructuring. Several new senior managers and advisors are brought into the divisional 
operations. The existing personnel dedicate a large fraction of their time to explaining and justifying their 
decisions to the new managers, modifying their procedures and plans according to the new guidance. The 
day-to-day decisions receive less attention and their quality suffers. Mistakes are made more often. The 
field personnel resent the erroneous guidance, and morale and discipline decline. Performance of the 
division suffers even further. The corporate management decides to step up the restructuring…and the 
vicious cycle continues.  
Scenario B. A corporation faces a new, unexpected tactic employed by its competitor. The tactic is 
successful and rapidly makes the business plans and procedures of the corporation inapplicable. 
Management attempts to introduce new ideas and approaches. Field personnel are bewildered and call 
for explanations and support. Decisions with new unfamiliar approaches become harder just as the 
attention of management is distracted by the competitor’s new tactics. The quality of decisions 
deteriorates. Management’s confidence plummets and decisions take even more effort. The competition 
exploits the errors and continues to succeed in altering the market position, which in turn requires more 
adjustments in corporate business tactic… which in turn causes more confusion and errors…  
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Qualitative discussions of challenges and phenomena in decision-making organizations are numerous, 
e.g., [2, 3, 4]. Related issues have been studied previously in a variety of fields including organizational 
design [5], distributed and group decision making [6, 7], human-automation interaction [8] and 
manufacturing systems [9].  Here, we focus on a quantitative analysis of the stability and overall 
performance of the decision-making aspects of an organization from a systems-theoretic perspective. We 
model the organization as a dynamic system of multiple decision-making models.  
The representation of human decision-making is a crucial aspect of our intellective models of decision-
making organizations.  For our purposes, we require highly abstract representations that reasonably 
approximate human behavior without reference to the semantic content of particular decision-making 
tasks.  The representation we choose is based on the fact that decisions (and all other cognitive processes) 
take time.  Thus, decision quality (e.g., accuracy) decreases when decision-making environments dictate 
that decisions be made before decision processes can be fully executed. More specifically, the accuracy of 
human decision-making for a particular decision-making task decreases in a nonlinear fashion as the rate 
at which decisions must be made increases. Demonstrations of this trade-off between decision speed and 
decision accuracy are widespread in experimental psychology.  Furthermore, the behavioral research base 
overwhelmingly shows this trade-off to be S-shaped [10, 11], as shown in the notional plot of decision 
accuracy as function of decision workload (i.e., rate) in Figure 1.    There is nothing magical about this S-
shaped function.  It merely shows a soft threshold for the impact of time-pressure on decision quality (i.e., 
accuracy).  The negative acceleration at the tails of curve simply indicates that the effect of time-pressure 
on decrements or increments in decision quality diminishes as decision accuracy approaches the limits of 
0 and 1.  It should be noted, however, that conclusive evidence of speed-accuracy trade-offs in more 
complex decision tasks (e.g., team decision-making) is scarce.  Given the methodological difficulties 
associated with demonstrating speed-accuracy trade-offs in basic laboratory tasks, the lack of evidence in 
complex tasks is not surprising, but one may conjecture that the S-shape tradeoff also applies. 
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Figure 1.  Accuracy-workload trade-off curve for human decision-makers is commonly described 
by an S-curve.  
 
The rate of requests for decisions is only one measure of decision workload. Other factors contributing to 
greater workload may include, for example, the complexity of decisions; criticality or risk associated with 
decisions; uncertainty in the available data; and latency of the available data.  Arguably the impact of 
these factors should be accounted for in models of decision-making organizations.  However, the veracity 
of such arguments must be considered with respect to the goals of the modeling endeavor.  Decisions in 
dynamic environments do indeed engage a variety of interrelated cognitive processes, ranging from 
monitoring, recognition and information search to planning, judgment and choice.  Incorporating these 
processes into a simulation to account for the variety of factors that may influence decision workload 
requires a commitment to a particular model of decision making processes – a topic of continuing debate.  
The indisputable fact that remains is that each of the cognitive processes engaged by dynamic decision-
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making tasks takes time.  Thus, in dynamic environments decision-makers are placed in a situation where 
they must control one time-dependent process (i.e., the evolving business situation) with another time-
dependent process (i.e., the cognitive processes underlying dynamic decision-making).  Decision-makers 
face this situation regardless of the complexity of a decision and any risks associated with it, or the quality 
of the data on which that decision is based.  For our purposes, therefore, we focused on the simplest and 
arguably the least contentious measure of decision workload – the rate of the decision requests per unit 
time.  
Consider a model of a decision-making organization consisting of a Head-Quarters (HQ) component and 
a field component as illustrated in Figure 2. The HQ component receives an input flow of orders from a 
higher authority (u – the number of orders per unit time) as well as a flow of requests for decisions from 
the field component (x2). The HQ component produces a flow of commands (x1) and sends them to the 
field. In general, some of the commands may be erroneous. A workload-accuracy trade-off function f(x)—
an example of the S-curve discussed earlier—governs the fraction of the errors. If a command is correct, it 
is assumed that the field component executes it successfully. If the command is erroneous, it results in 
problems in the field. The problems manifest themselves in the number of requests for decisions 
generated by the field component and sent back to the HQ component. A constant coefficient, K, relates 
the number of erroneous commands to the number of new decisions that must be made as results of the 
errors. A greater value of K corresponds to a greater confusion caused by an erroneous command within 
the field component, and to a greater ability of the adversary to exploit the error. Here, a discrete-time 
approach is used; the accuracy, at a particular time instant, of outgoing decisions is a function of the 
decision requirements at the previous time instant. 
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Figure 2. A decision-making organization consisting of a Head-Quarters (HQ) component and a 
field component. 
   
If we use x1 and x2 as internal states, the dynamics of the system are given by 
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Numerical computations using Matlab [12] yield the results depicted in Figure 3. The lines marked “20%” 
and “80%” show where the fraction of the erroneous commands issued by the HQ component stays at the 
levels of .2 and .8 respectively. We observe that for K<1 the system remains theoretically stable, but 
higher values of u can lead to a rapid increase in the fraction of the erroneous decisions, in essence 
supplying a domain-specific type of instability. For K >1, the system can exhibit unstable behavior at 
higher values of u.  As K increases, the instability occurs at progressively lower values of u.   In domain-
specific terms, this means that if one lowers the ability of the field component to correct for erroneous 
commands, then the combined decision-making organization becomes unstable at lower values of input 
commands (u).    
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Figure 3.  Stability regions as a function of gain on incorrect messages and of input task rate. 
 
Clearly, this result is qualitatively consistent with the realistic scenarios A and B we introduced above. 
The value of the model is not in its ability to predict specific quantitative behavioral characteristics of a 
specific organization. Rather, it offers easily comprehended suggestions of possible phenomena to explore 
with more in-depth analyses (e.g., with high-fidelity emulative models). So, what does this model 
suggest? 
First, it points to the importance of modeling feedback channels, particularly those associated with 
erroneous decisions. Depending on the structure and tasks of the organization, the impact on its 
productivity can vary widely.  
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Second, our model highlights the importance of modeling the reduction in decision quality due to time 
pressure. The drop in quality of decision making due to the complexity of a task can have a massive 
impact on the predicted performance of an organization. 
Third, our model allows us to hypothesize useful directions for further study in terms of the design of 
experiments that employ high-fidelity emulative models. In particular, the susceptibility of an 
organization to self-reinforcing error, according to this simple intellective model, depends mainly on two 
key parameters: a –the extent to which the decision-maker is able to absorb the flow of higher-authority 
commands, and K—the measure of how well the field operators are enabled and empowered to handle 
locally erroneous or late decisions coming from their superiors. Knowing these major influencers can be 
valuable guidance for a designer of an organization who models its performance in order to verify its 
robustness under dynamic conditions.  
 
11 
Propagation of Disruptions in Organizations 
Now let us extend the simple model of the previous section to consider networks of decision making 
units.  In order to do this, we first build up a generic component model that can be inserted in a standard 
hierarchical authority structure where tasks or messages are received from a superior and distributed 
amongst subordinates.  Such a model is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. An intermediate component in a network of decision makers. 
In this model, message flow down through the hierarchy is characterized by the rate and accuracy (percent 
error) while message flow up is characterized only by the message rate.   We emphasize that this model is 
also intellective, as in the first example above.   The incoming message load to this component is 
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)()( 32 kuku  , and we assume that the errors created by this component are based on the same speed-
accuracy trade off in the first example above, i.e. the incurred error percentage is 
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This error percentage is in addition to that already in the messages from the superior, u1(k). The rate of 
messages to the superior is meant to capture the need for clarification, and therefore we assume this is the 
product of the current incoming rate from the superior, the total error percentage of those messages 
))()(()( 321 kukufku  , and a gain factor K representing the susceptibility to confusion at this 
component.  We assume the percent error in the messages that flow through to subordinate nodes is the 
sum of the received error rate from superior nodes,  u1(k), and the incurred errors by this component in the 
correct messages, ))()(())(1( 321 kukufku  .   And, finally, the message rate to the subordinate nodes is 
set equal to the received message rate from the superior node at the previous time step.  Note that the 
message rate received from subordinates, u3(k), may also include exogenous inputs representing 
additional requests for decision directly from the field. 
This results in the following set of difference equations. 
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This model of an intermediate component is used to construct networks of decision-makers by linking 
inputs and outputs.  We consider first the network illustrated in Figure 5.  This is a purely hierarchical 
network in which components receive and interpret messages from their superior components and then 
direct messages to their subordinate components (as well as respond to their superiors) as expected from 
the description above.  
The stability of the hierarchical network was analyzed in simulation, subject to the rate of exogenous 
high-level inputs from above, i.e. u1(k) in the top component, and the rate of exogenous inputs from the 
field, i.e. u3(k) in the four bottom components.  Figure 8 shows the average error rate in commands to the 
field components, i.e. the average of y2(k) in each bottom component, as the exogenous input from above 
is increased.  We note that the system maintains its performance at a near-constant level and then rapidly 
collapses.   
To evaluate the envelope for stability subject to variations in exogenous inputs from the field, we 
stimulated the inputs u3(k) in the far right and far left components with constant inputs.  Figure 9 shows 
the stability envelope subject to the sum and difference of these constant inputs. The interpretation of 
stability in these graphs is not a standard systems-theoretic instability (i.e. bounded inputs result in 
bounded outputs) but rather a domain-specific meaning of instability alluded to above (i.e. feedback 
leading to the production of high fraction of incorrect commands).  In these simulations, systems-theoretic 
instability was excluded with the use of saturation devices.  It was also observed during simulations of 
this network that the instability had a tendency to propagate through the hierarchical structure, i.e. 
overload at one location affects other locations by overloading the higher-level components which then in 
turn overload their subordinates.  
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Figure 5. A hierarchical organization. 
    
Active Compensation 
Monitoring and diagnostic functions—human or computerized—are critical to detection and mitigation of 
positive feedback. The intent of such monitoring is to introduce corrective measures when the system or 
organization approaches a danger zone, perhaps the limit of stability. We also mentioned the possibility of 
using reconfigurable systems to deal with undesirable and non-normative situations. Such ideas lead us to 
consider a possible approach to mitigating degradations in decision quality based on an active 
compensating component.  
Consider the network illustrated in Figure 6, in which a compensating component, e.g. a task allocator or 
broker that re-distributes messages or tasks, is introduced to the network as an intermediary between 
superior and subordinates in order to re-distribute tasks or messages.  The compensating component is 
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illustrated in Figure 7.  Although this component continues to propagate errors through the system, it 
attempts to drive the message rates to subordinates to a uniform distribution of messages, i.e. based on 
measured return rates from the subordinate components, future messages are directed away from 
components that have high-levels of additional decision-making requests. It is assumed that the 
compensating component is itself subjected to the speed-accuracy trade-off because any functions that 
were performed by the intermediate levels in Figure 5 remain.  Hence, the redistributing component adds 
errors to the messages depending on the total number of messages received from superior and subordinate 
components.  This also allows us to focus on the impact of the redistribution of messages rather than the 
impact of the removal of the intermediate level of decision-making. The following difference equations 
are used to model the behaviour of the compensating re-redistributing component. . 
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Figure 6. A network with a compensating component (e.g. a broker). 
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Figure 7.  A compensating component. 
 
Again, the stability of the network with a redistribution component was analyzed in simulation subject to 
the rate of exogenous high-level inputs from above, i.e. u1(k) in the top component, and the rate of 
exogenous inputs from the field, i.e. u3(k) in the four bottom components.   Figure 8 shows the results 
along with the results for the hierarchical network.  Again, the graphs shows the average error rate in 
commands to the field components, i.e. the average of y2(k) in each bottom component, as the exogenous 
input from above is increased.  We note that with the redistribution component, the system also maintains 
its performance at a near-constant level and then rapidly collapses, though now at a higher total rate than 
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the pure hierarchical network.  Again, the stability was evaluated subject to variations in exogenous inputs 
from the field in the same way as for the hierarchical network, i.e. inputs u3(k) in the far right and far left 
components were stimulated with different constant inputs.  Figure 9 shows the stability envelope subject 
to the sum and difference of these constant inputs, alongside that for the hierarchical network. The 
stability envelope is increased with the inclusion of the compensating component, and therefore the 
system becomes more robust to variations in the difference in exogenous inputs at different components.   
 
 
Figure 8.  Accuracy of messages to field components as a function of the rate of high-level 
commands. 
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Figure 9.  Stability regions with respect to combined field inputs and difference in field inputs at 
two locations. 
 
Dynamic Reorganization to Mitigate Malfunctions 
The simplified models above indicate that an appropriately designed compensating component could 
significantly improve the performance of a decision-making organization over a broader range of 
operating conditions. But so far we said nothing about how such a component would actually be 
implemented.  We explore now a more specific scheme to such an active compensation, and consider the 
internal workings of a compensating component that dynamically re-organizes the allocation of decision-
making responsibilities and flows of relevant information.   
In the traditional theory and practice of distributed and hierarchical control systems, a supervising 
controller issues commands to lower level controllers.  These commands become inputs or set points for 
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the control processes of the lower-level controllers.  The responsibilities and types of interactions between 
lower level controllers are static.  They are fixed when the system is designed and remain constant while 
the system operates.  When this constant definition of responsibilities and interactions becomes 
inadequate to adapt to the changing circumstances, as will be the case in an uncertain environment with 
adversarial threats and changing information requirements, the control system is unable to perform 
effectively.  Additionally, in the context of a team of decision-makers that is composed of humans as well 
as automated control processes, it is typically a human senior leader (a military commander, or a senior 
manager) who controls the allocation of decision-making and information-sharing responsibilities as well 
as the modes of such sharing. The structure of the team is also often fixed in a hierarchical format.  A 
human leader typically adjusts decision-making and information-sharing responsibilities based on 
informal techniques, intuition, and best guesses based on prior experience and training [2, 5, 13, 14].  
However, this control can break down when the complexity and speed of changes in the situation exceeds 
the cognitive and reasoning capabilities of the human controller. This problem may be exacerbated in 
those teams that include software agents and robots as decision-makers [E.g., [24])  because these 
artificial decision-makers can observe, execute their decision-making algorithms, and act much faster than 
a human controller, potentially leading to a cascade of failures and poor team performance [15]. 
Here we explore a computer-assisted approach for managing decision-making, information-sharing 
responsibilities, and modes of interactions between the team members that allows the team to effectively 
and rapidly adapt to changing circumstances, threats and opportunities. 
The predictive control scheme is illustrated in Figure 10 and involves four main aspects that are described 
in the following sections.   Predictive control is often employed, even if only implicitly, in planning and 
execution of military operations and industrial engineering applications.  An internal model exists, even if 
only informally in the commander’s situational awareness, and is used to determine an input that can then 
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be applied to the real system.  This is done either analytically if it is a mental model or through simulation 
if it is a computer model.   
In Figure 10, we consider the input to the physical world or action space, to be the structure of the 
decision-making team, i.e. the decision responsibilities and information channels. The epistemological 
content of the decisions themselves remains in the physical action space.  The internal model within the 
predictive controller is only an abstraction that captures quantitatively the decision load and information 
channel loads.  Similarly, as illustrated in Figure 10, the forecast decision requirements from the physical 
action space are abstracted to a set of time-varying parameters that are used as an open-loop input for the 
simulation of the decision-making process. The standard model-predictive control process is then enacted; 
different information structures are simulated with the given forecast decision requirements and a best 
structure is chosen and used for the real decision making team in the physical action space.  This process 
of simulating a variety of information structures is captured by the internal optimization loop of 
Figure 10. 
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Figure 10.  The control scheme for dynamic allocation of decision responsibilities and information 
sharing. 
 
Modeling Team Decision-Making: Decision Responsibility and Information Structure 
For illustrative purposes, we consider a simple example of a team of three decision-makers – a foreman, a 
scout and a robot – involved in a mission whose objective is to extinguish a fire in a large chemical plant.  
We assume that an initial ad-hoc plan calls for the foreman to observe the fire from an observation post, 
the scout to identify a target location for dropping fire extinguishing material and then join the foreman, 
and the robot to drop the fire extinguishing material at the identified target location. An example of 
possible decisions required is as follows: 
U1 – When and where to call a vehicle for the foreman escape. 
U2 – When and on which target to drop fire extinguishing material. 
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U3 – Which flight path to take to reach the target. 
U4 – When to egress and which egress route to choose for the scout. 
We will re-visit this example as notions are developed.  The questions we wish to address in the context 
of this example are 
 Which, of the three team-members, should be responsible for deciding U1 through U4? 
 How should the current decision outcomes be disseminated to other members in the team (noting, of 
course, the key fact that too much information may have negative consequences when an urgent 
decision is needed)? 
 If we can predict the difficulty and urgency of decisions U1 through U4, can we manage the answers 
to the first two questions? i.e. can we dynamically update who is responsible for which decisions and 
how the decision outcomes are disseminated.  
 
Note that the decision-makers in this example are one and the same as the actors, but this is for 
convenience only.  There may be entities in the decision-making teams that are physically removed from 
the field, e.g.  an experienced foreman at another plant.  Also note that here we are not considering the 
control of the observation process, again for convenience. Elsewhere [23], it is proposed that observation 
channels be controlled in much the same way as decisions.  In our example, this could mean for instance 
appending the observations ‘Z1- Location of the fire’ and ‘Z2 – Types of target locations’ to the list of 
decisions. 
Let us employ a straightforward model to capture the traditional relationship between the task 
characteristics of complexity, urgency and decision load and the resulting accuracy of the decision [10, 
11, 16, 17].  A set of parameterized curves in which accuracy is inversely proportional to the time 
pressure is used for this purpose.   An example of this relationship is shown in Figure 11. Unlike the 
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simpler S-curve (Figure 1), here the additional parameters of normalized discriminability and the number 
of the options provide an upper and lower bound on the accuracy as illustrated. In a practical 
implementation of the scheme, characteristics of the decision-making entities could be used to quickly 
generate models from a pre-determined virtual decision-maker coefficient database.  Such characteristics 
might include rank and experience level for a human decision maker or processor capability, function and 
speed for an artificial decision-maker. As we are presently interested in the analysis of trends and the 
effectiveness of the approach, a relatively simple model suffices.  
The relationship in Figure 11 is used to build dynamic input/output models for single decision-makers in 
the same way as was done in Figure 4 for the previous example The normalized discriminability and 
number of options are exogenous inputs to the decision-making team and we assume these are properties 
of the decisions themselves rather than the interaction processes in the team decision-making.  Further, we 
assume the time-pressure has two sources.  First, there is an exogenous component that must be predicted, 
but additionally there is time-pressure that results from the necessity of interactions with other team 
members.  Clearly, if another team-member is urgently soliciting information on a different topic, this 
reduces the amount of time that can be spent on the decision at hand and so increases the time pressure. 
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Figure 11.  The decision-accuracy relationship for one decision-maker. 
 
The input/output model for a single decision-maker is used as an atomic block to construct the team 
decision-making model.  The connections between the atomic blocks are determined by what we will term 
the information structure.  This term is not uncommon in the literature on decentralized and distributed 
control in more general settings [18, 19, 20].  We borrow the term here to refer specifically to the 
combination of three objects: an observation structure, which maps the incoming data streams to the 
decision-making entities, or agents, a decision-responsibility structure which partitions the outgoing 
decision variables amongst the agents and a decision-sharing structure which defines the information 
paths between agents.  
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A possible information structure for the fire-fighting example discussed above is partially illustrated in 
Figure 12.  The decisions that each member is responsible for are indicated beside each agent, e.g. the 
foreman is responsible for U1, and this defines the decision-responsibility structure.  The decision-
sharing structure is illustrated with connecting arcs. The labels on these arcs show the decision that is 
being communicated and the mode in which it is communicated.   Here, we consider only two modes: a 
pull mode in which the first decision-maker communicates information only if the second requests the 
communication, and a push mode, in which the first decision-maker immediately communicates any new 
information.  Though there is certainly a spectrum of possible interactions of this sort, we have identified 
these two modes for a preliminary analysis.  The observation structure is again left out for convenience 
(see the previous footnote).   Note, from a semantic point of view, there is a minimal necessary 
information transfer for the decisions to be made.   For instance, decision U3 (the route taken to the target 
location) necessitates knowledge of decision U2 (selection of the location and timing for the target).  
Accordingly, we define a decision dependency criterion that underlies the dynamics of the model.  
Information structures that do not meet this minimal criterion will perform poorly because, for example, 
decisions concerning U3 made in the absence of knowledge of U2 are given arbitrarily an accuracy of 
zero per cent (we assume informally that two wrongs do not make a right).  The decision dependencies for 
this example are that U1 requires knowledge of U2 and U3, U2 requires U1, U3 requires U1 and U2 and 
U4 requires U1 and U2.   We assume that the minimal criterion can be met with either the pull or push 
mode communication.  For simplicity, the observation process is not modeled in this example, and so the 
observation structure is not defined here.  However, in general, the observation structure would define a 
set of observations, e.g. Z1 and Z2 for each decision-maker.    
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Figure 12. The decision-makers in the fire-fighting example communicate with one another and 
take responsibility for specific tasks as described by an information structure. 
 
Measuring Decision-Making Performance 
How do we know if a one information structure is better than another? A quantitative measure of 
decision-making performance (e.g. overall accuracy or timeliness of decisions) is required as a measuring 
stick for the suitability of a given information structure.  Clearly, the true intrinsic value of a given 
information structure is its effectiveness in the real world, but unfortunately without a high-fidelity 
simulation of the “physical action space” in Figure 10, this is not available.  While a number of surrogate 
measures can be envisioned, we explore a particular one - a weighted average of the accuracies of all 
decisions being made by the team, integrated over the time horizon.   This serves as an approximate 
indicator of performance.   A potential implementation would couple decision-making models with an 
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action space simulation so that the predicted overall effectiveness could in fact be used as a fitness 
function. 
As indicated in Figure 10, the value of the fitness function is used to fine-tune the information structure.  
Smoothness or monotonicity of the fitness function with respect to changes in information structure will 
not generally hold.  More importantly, changes in the information structure are discrete yielding a discrete 
(in state) and highly non-linear optimization problem.   In general, traditional continuous-state feedback 
control techniques are not directly applicable.  
Repeated simulation for different alternative information structures can be performed to maximize the 
fitness function.  This in effect requires a search of the space of information structures.  The optimization 
problem can be stated formally in a form similar to the observation problem suggested in [20] and here, as 
there, it will generally bear no analytic solution. In practice, the optimization of responsibility/information 
structure cannot be de-coupled from the optimization of the physical actions, such as the execution of a 
military operation. However, an iterative or serial approach may provide reasonable solutions; current 
traditional operations planning tools do not explicitly consider the information structure as a quantity to 
be controlled, however future operations planning may plan both physical operations and the information 
structure. 
Forecasting Decision Requirements 
In the decision-making accuracy curve in Figure 11, normalized discriminability, the number of options 
and a time pressure characterize each decision.  When this model is used in simulation within each 
dynamic model of decision-making, predictions for these characteristics are required in order to select the 
most appropriate information structure. The characteristics are predicted for a rolling time horizon (for the 
next 6 hours, for instance).  Of course, these predictions should change due to action space events that are 
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a result of the change in information structure.  However, that is not considered here; the predictions are 
taken as fixed for the purposes of optimizing the information structure. 
In practice, the raw information from which these characteristics could be predicted comes directly from 
the observations of the action space and other information and intelligence sources.    
An example of predicted decision requirements for the four decisions for the fire-fighting scenario is 
shown in Figure 13 for a time horizon of 6 hours.  For the purposes of our example, these were generated 
manually on the basis of the notional progression of the fire and the related actions of the fire-fighting 
team.  For instance, the decision characteristics of U1 (corresponding to the decisions concerning the 
escape vehicle for the foreman) are such that there is little time pressure and many options at time zero, 
but as the fire progresses the time pressure increases (reflected by a decrease in the graph, which depicts 
time availability) and the number of options decreases steadily.  This might be the case if escape vehicle 
options become scarcer as the fire approaches locations close to the foreman.  
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Figure 13. Future decision characteristics are predicted from information sources and used to fine 
tune the information structure. 
 
A Simulation of the Fire-fighting Example   
Figure 14 shows a Matlab Simulink [12] implementation of the model in which the atomic blocks for the 
foreman, robot and scout in the fire-fighting example are connected based on a given information 
structure, e.g. that in Figure 12.   The forecast decision requirements in Figure 13 are used as exogenous 
inputs to this model.  By simulating this model in time, we are able to generate, for any given information 
structure, an average accuracy of decisions over both time and decisions which provides a measure of 
performance for this information structure.  
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Figure 14. The proposed scheme for predictive control implemented in MATLAB Simulink for a 
small-scale example. 
 
We investigated an optimization scheme based on a genetic algorithm, although a number of discrete 
optimization techniques could be potentially applicable.   The information structure is encoded as a 
chromosome without content loss, and the fitness of each chromosome is evaluated with a direct 
simulation of the team-decision making model in MATLAB Simulink.  The Genetic Algorithm 
Optimization Toolbox [21] offers a large variety of mutation operators, crossover operators and selection 
criteria and is well suited for this application.    
Results for this optimization appear promising for the small-scale exploratory scenario with convergence 
to a (locally) optimal information structure with greatly improved fitness in realistic computational cost. 
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A small variety of meaningful, common-sense, information structures was produced (see Figure 15 for 
two examples), depending on how the forecast predictions were varied.  This matches at least with 
intuitive notions of how teams should communicate and share tasks, and indicates the potential for the 
approach to be applied in real systems with higher-fidelity decision-making models. 
 
 
Figure 15. Examples of locally optimal information structures for given sets of predicted decision 
characteristics. 
 
One might wonder how the effectiveness of such an approach depends on the characteristics of the 
environment in which the organization operates.  Figure 16 conjectures a notional landscape of types of 
decision making environments categorized by the accuracy of the predictions that can be made and the 
rate of change of the environment or operations tempo.  The regions denote where we believe it is 
appropriate to use dynamically managed team decision-making rather than traditional team decision-
making where information structure is either rigid or evolves on an ad hoc basis.  As the tempo of 
operations increases and the accuracy of predictions in the action space decrease, we believe it becomes 
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more difficult to recognize the need for changes in information structure and therefore it is in these cases 
that dynamic management of the information structure will improve performance.  
 
 
Figure 16. The regions of general applicability of conventional and dynamically managed team 
decision-making. 
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Mitigating and Inducing Malfunctions 
So, what do these models and simulations tell us about the susceptibility of an organizational decision-
making process to an adversarial action? What can an organization do to mitigate its susceptibility to a 
malfunction? What can an adversary do to induce a malfunction? Based on the results of the simulations 
we described, one can suggest several approaches to architecting and operating an organization in a way 
that reduces its susceptibility to malfunctions. 
Empower  subordinates via mission-type orders. The onset of collapse can be delayed by reducing the 
number of requests sent from the field components to the decision-making components This suggests that 
such a collapse can be mitigated by enabling the field components to operate as independently as possible 
in order to minimize the amount of cases in which they must call for the decision of the higher decision-
making components. Providing the field components with maximum autonomy, using mission-type orders 
that specify the goals but not the specific ways to achieve them and using command-by-negation (defined 
below) all contribute to the reduction of the K parameter and strongly improve stability of the overall 
system (see Figure 3). Conversely, an adversary may exploit the situations where field components within 
the target organization are compelled to operate under strict and detailed control by higher-level decision 
making components. An adversary may also attempt to induce this tight control by generating extensive 
negative publicity about any error committed by field components.    
Prioritize and delegate.  Degradation can be avoided by dumping excessive messages, i.e. by ignoring 
some of them and insisting subordinate decision-makers handle problems autonomously. In practice, this 
is one of the mechanisms that organizations employ to reduce the effects of decision overload.   Decision-
makers learn to prioritize their decision-making load ignore what appears less important.  
Use command-by-negation, not command-by-permission. The fact that dumping of decision load is often 
necessary to avoid self-reinforcing degradation provides insight and support to the intuition that 
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command-by-negation is advantageous as compared to command-by-permission. In the command-by-
permission protocol, a lower-level decision-making component detects a condition, formulates a plan for 
action, sends a request for permission to execute the action to the higher-level component, waits for the 
permission (or denial) to arrive, and then executes the action. In the command-by-negation protocol, the 
lower level component does not wait for permission, but proceeds to execute the action when the time is 
right, while being prepared to abort the action if the higher-level component responds negatively. Clearly, 
avoidance of degradation by dumping at the higher-level component can be done more effectively in 
command-by-negation – if the higher-level component ignores the message, it does not prevent the lower-
level component from executing the desired action. The same dumping of messages at the higher-level 
component in command-by-permission prevents the lower-level component from executing the necessary 
actions to exploit an opportunity or to block a threat. In both cases, dumping enables the decision-making 
organization to avoid the degradation, but in the case of command-by-permission this avoidance leads to 
greater rigidity and passivity.      
Minimize the need for coordination. Minimizing coordination loops, both vertical and horizontal, reduces 
susceptibility to self-reinforcing degradation. Although reduction in coordination may appear counter-
intuitive and controversial, some of the human factors literature has been calling attention to the potential 
negative impact of coordination requirements for a long time, e.g., Morgan and Bowers [15] cite findings 
from Naylor and Briggs [22] as follows:  "...the performance of operators in a simulated air-intercept task 
was superior when the subjects worked independently of one another. Decrements in performance were 
observed when operators were placed in an organizational structure that encouraged interaction among the 
operators." Experimental findings (e.g., [13]) show that teams tend to perform better when they are able to 
communicate less under high-stress conditions. In the design of decision-making organization, assigning 
tasks to minimize the need for coordination reduces the amount of knowledge the team members need to 
have about each other’s roles, and the amount they need to communicate, which can result in better 
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overall performance [14]. An adversary, however, can compel increased coordination requirements by 
injecting misleading or conflicting information, or by presenting an organization with events that, by their 
very nature, require highly coordinated responses from multiple sub-organizations. 
Insulate the weak link. Weaker decision-making components within the organization can accelerate the 
collapse of the entire system. It is advisable to insulate such a component from the rest of the system 
either by providing a greater degree of supervision or, if unavoidable, by allowing such a component to 
fail in its mission without expending excessive effort on the part of the superior component. This, 
however, may not be possible when the weak component is engaged in a critical task.  This is also a 
situation that an intelligent adversary will attempt to create and exploit.  
Diagnose on-line and compensate by dynamic reorganization. In several experiments, we observed 
consistent symptoms of the onset of collapse manifesting themselves well in advance of the actual 
collapse. This observation suggests a possibility of introducing an on-line diagnostic mechanism. Further, 
diagnosis leads to a possible compensation by dynamic reorganization, such as we explored in this paper 
(Figures 8 and 9). From the perspective of an adversary, however, the diagnostic and reorganization 
functions constitute excellent high value targets.   
 
Now, in spite of this rich harvest of practical insights, we must remind ourselves that intellective models 
are not intended to produce definitive recommendations. Their value is in generating useful suggestions: 
suggestions for high-fidelity modeling approaches, suggestions for the design of experiments and 
suggestions for possible policy or structure redesigns.  All these are to be explored and validated by other 
more concrete models or experiments. Despite their limitations, the strength of intellective models is that 
they are uniquely capable of identifying a phenomenon that would be difficult to detect in a pure and 
readily recognizable form in a real organization or even in an emulative model.  By avoiding unnecessary 
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detail, intellective models offer tools that help researchers visualize and explore the dependencies and the 
impacts of key factors in a manner that is relatively easy to grasp.  
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